We’re taking a detour back into my favorite subject, pricing–oft overlooked by founders and GTM leaders because, well, it’s boring and nerdy. But nothing is more important–except, maybe, top of funnel.

Pricing is the most under leveraged variable in GTM. It's not the sexiest subject. But nothing moves revenue faster — and founders get it wrong constantly, in the same direction, every time.

So let's talk about skiing.

The ultimate product deficiency

You can’t ski without snow, and this winter was historically bad in the American West.

Colorado entered the season with snowpack at 54% of the historical median — tied for the lowest start on record. Vail Resorts told investors that only 11% of terrain was open in December.

Visitation at Vail's U.S. properties dropped 20% – which when you compare it to the upward trend every year, is even more devastating.

Mountain towns that depend entirely on ski tourism were — and many still are — genuinely hurting across multiple sectors.

I ski, and this season was demoralizing.

Tahoe was mostly dirt at Christmas and just hit 68 degrees in March. There were maybe two windows of good conditions all year, and both came with so much snow that roads closed and mountains shut temporarily.

Play the game differently

So: what did Alterra Mountain Company — the company behind Palisades Tahoe, Mammoth, Steamboat, Jackson Hole, Copper Mountain, and the Ikon Pass — do in response?

They raised prices.

The 2026-27 Ikon Pass went on sale March 12 at $1,399 — up $70 from last year. The Ikon Base Pass went to $949, up $40. And then, on top of that, Alterra added a brand new, more expensive product: a fully refundable pass tier. For a 20% price premium, you can cancel your pass and get a full refund through January 15, 2027 — as long as you haven't used it. Use it once, you get 50% back. After that, nothing.

A put option. On skiing. Right after the worst season in recent memory.

This is not a mistake. It's a masterclass.

The instinct most companies have after letting customers down

Apologize with the wallet. Discount. Offer loyalty credits. Run a "we heard you" campaign. Reduce prices to win back trust.

Alterra did the opposite — and it was correct.

Here's why: the pain customers felt this year was not I don't want to ski anymore. It was I paid for a season and didn't get what I paid for. Those are different problems.

The first is a demand problem. You solve it by lowering prices.

The second is a risk problem. You solve it by selling insurance — and you charge for it.

Alterra kept the core pass price high, because skiers still want to ski. And they monetized the anxiety that a bad season creates. The cancellation option doesn't compensate for last year. It eliminates the fear of a repeat. That's a product people will pay for, even if they never use it.

Why founders discount when they shouldn't

The product isn't perfect yet. A feature is missing. The competition does something better. So the founder — who knows every flaw intimately — starts apologizing in sales meetings. Adds features to close deals. Trims the price. Tells themselves the discount is temporary.

I do this. Did it last month–gave a difficult customer a discount. Why? They went on vacation instead of getting set up and blamed us for launching after we said we would.

Not doing that again.

But they churned anyway. Why?

Discounts almost never work.

And they’re almost never temporary.

Discounting signals uncertainty. It tells the customer: I'm not sure this is worth full price either. Customers read that. They negotiate harder. They churn faster. They tell others the real price is lower than the sticker.

Alterra just raised prices on a product that epically underdelivered this year. The core feature — snow — was basically missing for months. And most skiers, myself included, will probably pay it anyway.

I'm reducing our household by one pass this year (my daughter isn't that into it). And yes, I briefly considered switching to an Epic pass purely out of spite.

I probably won't. Most people won't.

The right pricing move

Alterra's pricing team understands something that most GTM leaders undervalue: price communicates confidence in the product.

A discount says the product needs help selling itself.

A price increase says the product speaks for itself.

But the cancellation tier is the more instructive lesson. When customers have a legitimate objection — what if the snow is bad again? — the weak response is to lower prices. The stronger response is to build a product that directly addresses the objection, and charge for it.

What's the equivalent in your business?

If customers say "we're not sure we'll get ROI," the weak response is a free trial or a discount. The stronger response is an ROI guarantee baked into a higher-priced tier. Charge for the confidence. Monetize the risk.

The bottom line

Pricing is boring. Most founders would rather talk about pipeline or product roadmap or sexy partnerships.

But a 10% price increase with zero churn impact goes entirely to the bottom line. No CAC. No new headcount. No features to build.

It might even improve conversion.

Alterra just priced like they believe in their product — after a year that would have sent most management teams scrambling.

The only question is whether you'll do the same.

PS: I’m seriously considering doing this kind of option for Skyp–thoughts?